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Abstract 
 
Recent years have seen significant interest among scholars of 
International Relations (IR) in ideological analysis. By treating 
international theories as international ideologies, this trend entails both a 
radical reconceptualization of IR’s disciplinary foundations as well as the 
emergence of important new lines of inquiry for scholars of ideology. And 
yet, as a research programme, ideological analysis in IR has failed to 
establish a significant foothold in the discipline. This article locates the 
source of this weakness in the fractious nature of IR as a discipline, which 
has contributed to the emergence of five distinct paradigms of ideological 
analysis: Analytical, Historical, Philosophical, Critical, and Reflexive. 
Reviewing these five distinct bodies of scholarship, this article 
demonstrates that ideological analysis is ‘alive and well’ in IR, but argues 
that greater engagement between divergent paradigms will be required in 
order to fully understand the complexities of international ideologies. 
 
                                                        
1 Published in the Journal of Political Ideologies, Vol. 22:3, 2017 
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Introduction: Ideological Analysis in International Relations 
 
Ideological analysis involves the study of diverse traditions of political 
thought and the way in which they relate to one another and to the social 
world more broadly. Within International Relations (IR), the sub-field of 
political science dedicated to the study of world politics, global affairs and 
relations between states, ideological analysis involves the study of the 
content, nature and effects of what I term here ‘international ideologies’. 
International ideologies are inter-subjectively held systems of thought 
consisting of basic claims concerning the nature of the international realm 
and the actors that populate it. They serve a primarily diagnostic function 
by helping individuals comprehend the nature of the international domain 
and to understand the logics underpinning its operation. Many traditions 
of international thought are as well-known as their domestic counterparts, 
including realism, liberalism, internationalism, globalism, 
cosmopolitanism, communitarianism, nationalism, idealism, militarism, 
and related variants of these basic ideals. Each of these traditions embody 
divergent conceptions of core concepts associated with international 
relations, including sovereignty, anarchy, power, community, interest, 
institutions and the state. 
 
An in-depth analysis of these different interpretations is beyond the scope 
of this inquiry, which is concerned rather with the prominence of 
 3 
ideological analysis within the discipline of IR and the different ways in 
which scholars have sought to understand these traditions. Whilst 
ideological analysis has flourished in political science and political theory 
more broadly, IR as a discipline has proven surprisingly resilient to the 
idea that core traditions of international thought may be regarded as 
‘ideologies’. This is in spite the efforts of several prominent scholars to 
promote ideological analysis within IR. Ceadel, for example, in his 1987 
book on the British peace movement, argued individuals disagreed about 
international questions because ‘they have different ideological 
preconceptions’, arguing in consequence that ‘the war and peace debate 
needs a general interpretive framework of the sort…long employed by 
students of domestic politics’. 2  Some years later, in this journal, Bell 
sought to apply Freeden’s morphological approach to ideological analysis 
to ‘internationally oriented thought-structures’, coining the term 
‘horizontal ideologies’ to denote patterns of belief that take as their 
subject-matter the relations between states or the nature of the 
international realm.3 
 
Despite these early efforts to introduce ideological analysis into IR, the 
field has struggled to achieve recognition, impact, and an independent 
identity. In 2003, for example, Oren noted that IR scholars seldom applied 
the concept of ideology to the theoretical concepts utilised in their own 
                                                        
2  Martin Ceadel, Thinking about Peace and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1987), p. 1. 
3  Duncan Bell, ‘Anarchy, power and death: contemporary political realism as ideology’, 
Journal of Political Ideologies, 7(2), (2002), pp. 221-239, at p. 225. 
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discipline.4 Rathbun, a year later, expressed his surprise at the absence of 
scholarship on ideology and international politics, even as the 
‘constructivist turn’ heralded a shift towards analysing ideas in an 
international context.5 Cantir and Kaarbo, in a recent survey, also noted 
that ‘there is little research on partisanship and political ideology in 
foreign policy [studies]’. 6  Thérien, most recently, has addressed the 
absence of ideological analysis in IR, noting his surprise that “the notion of 
ideology has not been systematically used in the analysis of world politics 
and global governance”. 7  This lacuna, moreover, is reinforced by the 
corresponding tendency for scholars of ‘domestic’ politics to shy away from 
the study of international belief-systems. Consider, for example, that in 
the past five years, only seven articles dealing with explicitly international 
belief-structured have been published in the Journal of Political Ideologies 
(JPI).8 
 
                                                        
4  Ido Oren, Our Enemies and Us: America’s Enemies and the Making of Political 
Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 172. 
5  Brian Rathbun, Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace 
Enforcement in the Balkans (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 6. 
6  Christian Cantir & Juliet Kaarbo, ‘Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections 
on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 
8(1), (2012), pp. 5-24, at p. 14. 
7  Jean-Philippe Thérien, ‘The United Nations ideology: from ideas to global politics’ 
Journal of Political Ideologies, 20(3), (2015), pp. 221-243, at p. 225. 
8  The works in question are: Roberto Farneti, ‘Cleavage lines in global politics: left and 
right, East and West, earth and heaven’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 17(2), (2012), 
pp. 127-145; Alex Schulman, ‘Carl Schmitt and the clash of civilizations: the missing 
context’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 17(2), (2012), pp. 147-167; Jan Zielonka, 
‘Europe’s new civilizing mission: the EU’s normative power discourse’, Journal of 
Political Ideologies, 18(1), (2013), pp. 35-55; Rafal Soborski, ‘Globalization and 
ideology: a critical review of the debate’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 17(3), (2012), 
pp. 323-346; Jean-Philippe Thérien, op. cit., Ref. 6; and Laurence Whitehead, 
‘International democracy promotion as political ideology: upsurge and retreat’, 
Journal of Political Ideologies, 20(1), (2015), pp. 10-26. 
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This then raises the interesting question of why ideological analysis has, 
in spite of repeated efforts, failed to take root in the discipline? Most 
scholars making the case for ideological analysis have cited the enduring 
appeal of realism as the main explanation for this underdevelopment.9 Yet 
this explanation is insufficient, since realism ceased to be the dominant 
paradigm of international studies in the 1990s – having since been 
superseded by constructivism10 – and since realism has always remained 
marginal within British and European IR.11 Both Rathbun and Thérien, 
for instance, record their surprise that the constructivist turn has not led 
to a more robust research programme on ideology and international 
relations.12 Even the growth of liberal theory – regardless of its association 
with rationalist assumptions and methodology13 – should have opened up 
greater space for ideology in the discipline, given its emphasis on sub-state 
variation in strategies and the ideational sources of foreign policy.14 To put 
it another way, while realism is no-longer dominant, international studies 
has failed to develop a broader appreciation for ideological analysis beyond 
a few isolated examples. 
                                                        
9  Martin Ceadel, op. cit., Ref. 1, p. 3; Duncan Bell, op. cit., Ref. 2, p. 222; R.B.J. Walker, 
Inside/outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), p. 104. 
10  The annual TRIP survey asked IR scholars across the globe which approach best 
defined their work. Of all the respondents (n=4659), 18% indicated realism, 23% 
constructivism, and 12% liberalism. Daniel Maliniak, Susan Peterson, Ryan Powers & 
Michael J. Tierney, TRIP 2014: Faculty Survey (Williamsburg, VA: Institute for the 
Theory and Practice of International Relations, 2014). Available at 
https://trip.wm.edu/charts/. 
11  John J. Mearsheimer, ‘E.H. Carr vs. Idealism: The Battle Rages On’, International 
Relations, 19(2), (2005), pp. 139-152, at p. 140. 
12  Brian Rathbun, op. cit., Ref. 4, p. 6; Jean-Philippe Thérien, op. cit., Ref. 6, p. 226. 
13  Helen Milner, ‘Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, 
American, and Comparative Politics’ International Organization, 52(4), (1998), pp. 
759-786, at p. 761. 
14  Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International 
Politics’, International Organization, 51(4), (1997), pp. 513-553, at p. 525. 
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A further reason for ideological analysis not taking off in the mainstream 
is the challenge it poses to the assumption of analytical neutrality at the 
core of these diverse theoretical paradigms. Adherents of individual 
paradigms treat the structures of thought that could inform ideological 
analysis as ontological ‘truths’, a status they are understandably reluctant 
to give up. Indeed, as noted in a standard textbook on the concept: 15 
 
[T]he word ideology comes trailing clouds of pejorative 
connotation…That our thought might be ideological is a suggestion 
that we almost instinctively reject lest the foundations of our most 
cherished concepts turn out to be composed of more shifting sand 
than we would like. 
 
There is no doubt some truth in the idea some scholars prefer the labels of 
‘theory’ to ‘ideology’, the preference for pursuing non-ideological study. Yet 
here again the explanation is incomplete; since the ‘constructivist turn’ in 
the 1990s, a significant number of scholars have sought to jettison the 
analytical assumptions behind positivist research and have embraced the 
interdependence of theory and practice. 16  Here again, even after the 
advent of a more reflexive approach to social inquiry in the field, the 
ideological analysis of international traditions has not occurred to the 
degree that might have been expected. 
                                                        
15  David McLellan, op. cit., Ref. 14, p. 1. 
16  Yosef Lapid, ‘The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-
Positivist Era’, International Studies Quarterly, 33(3), (1989), pp. 235-254, at p. 237. 
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If neither the dominance of realism nor positivism within the discipline of 
IR can explain the trials of ideological analysis in IR, then an explanation 
must be sought elsewhere. This article makes two principal claims, which 
it illustrates through a survey of the existing literature on international 
ideologies. The first is that, in spite of repeated claims to the contrary, 
there already exists a substantial body of scholarship that applies the 
assumptions of ideological analysis to the principal traditions of 
international thought. What has appeared to many scholars as a dearth of 
work on ideological analysis and world politics is actually a perceived gap 
in the literature, since a diverse array of authors have already made 
significant inroads into the study of international ideologies. The second is 
that this literature is highly fractious, divided as it is into several largely 
distinct paradigms (or ‘scholarly communities’) 17 within which relatively 
separate conversations about ideology are taking place, mostly without 
reference to the work of competing paradigms. Herein lies one reason for 
the frequency with which the absence of ideological analysis in IR is 
proclaimed. The real problem, therefore, is not that IR is a stranger to 
ideological analysis, but that inter-paradigmatic disagreements (be they 
ontological, epistemological, methodological or linguistic) and the minimal 
intra-paradigmatic contacts afforded by the discipline have prevented the 
                                                        
17  For a discussion on the paradigmatic fault-lines in IR see Patrick Jackson & Daniel 
Nexon, ‘Paradigmatic Faults in International-Relations Theory’, International Studies 
Quarterly, 53, (2009), pp. 907-930, at p. 907. 
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establishment of a self-aware research programme around international 
ideologies. 
 
My intention in this article is to survey the existing work which treats 
traditions of international thought as ‘ideologies’, irrespective of whether 
these works self-identify with the label of ‘ideological analysis’. The aim is 
twofold: First, to contribute to the development of a self-reflexive research 
programme on the study of international ideologies and in so doing 
promote engagement between diverse research programmes working on 
similar questions and puzzles. Second, to establish the primary fault-lines 
of disagreement within existing scholarship and to establish what is at 
stake in the various substantive, theoretical and methodological debates 
in the field. The argument proceeds as follows. I begin by summarising the 
state of the discipline by distinguishing five paradigms of ideological 
analysis in studies of international politics: (a) analytical, (b) historical, (c) 
philosophical, (d) critical, and (e) reflexive. I then discuss four key areas of 
disagreement that emerge from the discussion, asking: (a) What is the 
status of these beliefs? (b) How should we study them? (c) What are the 
relevant ideologies? and (d) Who are their holders? 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
International Ideologies: Five Paradigms 
 
In this section I discuss the key assumptions of five largely distinct 
traditions of ideological analysis that have developed within the broader 
discipline of IR. I offer examples of scholars whose work is associated with 
each sub-field and elaborate upon the principal epistemological and 
methodological assumptions underlying each tradition. It is worth noting 
at the outset that these traditions do not represent mutually exclusive 
epistemological or ontological categories but rather groupings of like-
minded scholarship which displays similarities in a number of respects. 
These paradigms represent distinct ‘conversations’ in the discipline within 
which ideological concepts and categories are subjected to theoretical 
inquiry. 
 
 
Analytical 
 
One research programme where inroads into ideological analysis have 
been made is analytical. The hallmark of the analytical approach is its 
commitment to the assumptions of positivist social science in order to 
understand the causal effects of subjectivity. First, analytical scholarship 
on international ideology retains the assumptions of ‘mind-world dualism’; 
that is, that there exists a separation between the subject (world) and the 
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observer (scholar) such that objective analysis is possible.18 This implies a 
relatively deterministic concept of causation, with the task of the 
researcher being to uncover the ‘causal mechanisms’ linking international 
ideologies to a variety of foreign policy outcomes.  Second, significant 
emphasis is placed on the operationalization of ideology as a variable and 
on questions of measurement. Martini, for example, in his study of citizen 
preferences over conflict in Libya and Afghanistan, argues for ‘a 
multidimensional conceptualisation… that covers the most basic beliefs 
within foreign policy’.19 Third, these works proceed most often through 
formal hypothesis testing, by elaborating theoretical claims and specifying 
the conditions under which they may be falsified. 20  This entails a 
preference for the use of methods associated with ‘positivist’ social science 
research, including case studies,21 the comparative method,22 regression 
analysis, 23  cross-tabulations and descriptive statistics, 24  large-scale 
surveys,25 and factor analysis.26 
                                                        
18  Patrick Jackson, ‘Foregrounding ontology: dualism, monism, and IR theory’, Review of 
International Studies, 34(1), (2008), pp. 129-153, at p. 132. 
19  Nicholas F. Martini, ‘Foreign Policy Ideology and Conflict Preferences: A Look at 
Afghanistan and Libya’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 11, (2015), pp. 417-434, at p. 420. 
20  Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Routledge, 1959), p. 10. 
21  Ole R. Holsti, ‘The belief system and national images: a case study’, Conflict 
Resolution, 6(3), 1979, pp. 244-252, at p. 246. 
22  Nicholas F. Martini, op. cit., Ref. 18, p. 424. 
23  Helen V. Milner & Benjamin Judkins, ‘Partisanship, Trade Policy, and Globalization: 
Is There a Left-Right Divide on Trade Policy?’, International Studies Quarterly, 48(1), 
(2004), pp. 95-120, at pp. 108-112. 
24  Peter H. Gries, The Politics of American Foreign Policy: How Ideology Divides 
Liberals and Conservatives (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014). 
25  Eugene Wittkopf, ‘On the Foreign Policy Beliefs of the American People: A Critique 
and Some Evidence’, International Studies Quarterly, 30, (1986), pp. 425-445, at pp. 
438-439; Richard K. Herrmann & Jonathan W. Keller, ‘Beliefs, Values, and Strategic 
Choice: US Leaders’ Decisions to Engage, Contain, and Use Force in an Era of 
Globalization’, Journal of Politics, 66(2), (2004), pp. 557-580, at pp. 564-565. 
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Much of the initial analytical work on international ideologies was 
developed by scholars of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), the sub-field of IR 
dedicated to the multi-level, interdisciplinary and integrative explanation 
of the processes underlying foreign policy decision-making.27 Initial work 
generally referred not to ideologies but to ‘belief systems’, defined as the 
‘set of lenses through which information concerning the…social 
environment is received…defining it…and identifying…its salient 
characteristics’. 28  Belief systems, it was held, could help explain the 
attitudes (and actions) of both policymakers 29  and the general public 
towards international issues. 30  Work on belief systems has gradually 
morphed into explicit studies of ideology and foreign policy, with various 
strands of FPA research analysing the link between domestic political 
ideologies of liberalism and conservatism and foreign policy positions, 31 
the effects of elite ‘foreign policy ideologies’ on intervention and conflict 
                                                                                                                                                              
26  William O. Chittick, Keith R. Billingsley & Rick Travis, ‘A Three-Dimensional Model 
of American Foreign Policy Beliefs’, International Studies Quarterly, 39, (1995), pp. 
313-331. 
27  Valerie Hudson, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of 
International Relations’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 1(1), (2005), pp. 1-30, p. 2. 
28  Ole R. Holsti, op. cit., Ref. 20, p. 245. 
29  Richard K. Herrmann & Jonathan W. Keller, op. cit., Ref. 24, p. 558; Ole R. Holsti, op. 
cit., Ref. 20, p. 245. 
30  Ole R. Holsti, ‘Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-
Lippmann Consensus’, International Studies Quarterly, 36, (1992), pp. 439-466; 
William O. Chittick, Keith R. Billingsley & Rick Travis, op. cit., Ref. 25; Eugene 
Wittkopf, op. cit., Ref. 24, p. 428. 
31  Peter H. Gries, op. cit., Ref. 23, pp. 44-48; Brian Rathbun, ‘Does One Right Make a 
Realist? Conservatism, Neoconservatism, and Isolationism in the Foreign Policy 
Ideology of American Elites’, Political Science Quarterly, 123(2), (2008), pp. 271-299; 
Brian Rathbun, ‘Politics and Paradigm Preferences: The Implicit Ideology of 
International Relations Scholars’, International Studies Quarterly, 56, (2012), pp. 607-
622; Henry Nau, ‘Conservative Internationalism’, Policy Review, 153, (2008), pp. 3-44. 
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initiation, 32  and the ‘folk-realism’ and other foreign policy ideologies 
within the general public. 33 
 
Incursions into ideological analysis have been made by ‘mainstream’ IR 
theorists too. Works of liberal IR scholarship, associated with rationalist 
theory and quantitative methodology, have often included measures of 
ideology or partisanship alongside their other variables, notably in liberal 
accounts of trade and foreign economic policy.34 Liberal scholars have also 
offered conceptual accounts of liberal internationalism as it has come to 
characterise the international system from 1945 onwards, as manifest in 
globalisation, the international political economy, democratization and the 
institutionalisation of world politics. 35  Neoclassical realists, whose 
analyses combine domestic variables with the core realist assumptions of 
                                                        
32  Nicholas F. Martini, op. cit., Ref. 18, p. 417; Timothy Hildebrandt, Courtney 
Hillebrecht, Peter M. Holm & Jon Pevehouse, ‘The Domestic Politics of Humanitarian 
Intervention: Public Opinion, Partisanship, and Ideology’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 9, 
(2013), pp. 243-266; Joshua Kertzer & Kathleen McGraw, ‘Folk Realism: Testing the 
Microfoundations of Realism in Ordinary Citizens’, International Studies Quarterly, 
56, (2012), pp. 245-258, at p. 246. 
33  Daniel Drezner, ‘The Realist Tradition in American Public Opinion’, Perspectives on 
Politics, 6, (2008), pp. 51-70; Brian Rathbun, ‘It takes all types: social psychology, 
trust, and the international relations paradigm in our minds’, International Theory, 
1(3), (2009), pp. 345-380. 
34  Benjamin O. Fordham, ‘Economic Interests, Party, and Ideology in Early Cold War 
Era US Foreign Policy’, International Organization, 52(2), (1998), pp. 359-396; Helen 
V. Milner & Benjamin Judkins, op. cit., Ref. 22. 
35  John Ikenberry is one self-identified liberal who has taken seriously this claim. See: 
G. John Ikenberry, ‘Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of 
Liberal World Order’, Perspectives on Politics, 7(1), (2009), pp. 71-87; and ‘A world 
economy restored: expert consensus and the Anglo-American postwar settlement’, 
International Organization, 46(1), (1992), pp. 289-321. Many other liberal IR theorists 
have strongly resisted labelling their analyses ‘ideological’. See, for example: Beate 
Jahn, ‘Liberal internationalism: from ideology to empirical theory – and back again’, 
International Theory, 1(3), (2009), pp. 409-438, and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘‘Wahn, Wahn, 
Überall Wahn’ A reply to Jahn’s critique of liberal internationalism’, International 
Theory, 2(1), (2010), pp. 113-139. 
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anarchy, self-help and the importance of power,36 have also incorporated 
ideology into their scholarship. These authors tend to address ‘power 
political’ questions of strategy and alliance choices and focus more on the 
‘distance’ between states’ ideological beliefs, rather than the content of 
these per se. Neoclassical analyses have emphasised the importance of 
ideological similarities and differences in animating the origins of the 
Second World War, 37  conflict between Western liberalism and Soviet 
communism during the Cold War,38 the shifting pattern of alliances in the 
Middle East, 39  and the geostrategic construction of post-Cold War 
Europe.40 
 
 
Historical 
 
International historians have generally been open to the idea of treating 
traditions of thought as ideologies rather than theories, since they have 
less at stake in these theoretical debates themselves, and since they 
generally proffer methodologically eclectic explanations of social reality. 
Thus, with some notable exceptions – including ‘realist’ historians like 
                                                        
36  Gideon Rose, ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics, 
51(1), (1998), pp. 144-172. 
37  For examples of neoclassical realist works on ideology see: Mark L. Haas, ‘Ideology 
and Alliances: British and French External Balancing Decisions in the 1930s’, 
Security Studies, 12(4), (2003), pp. 34-79; Mark L. Haas, The Ideological Origins of 
Great Power Politics, 1789-1989 (London: Cornell University Press, 2005), Ch. 4. 
38  Mark L. Haas, ‘The United States and the End of the Cold War: Reactions to Shifts in 
Soviet Power, Policies, or Domestic Politics?’, International Organization, 61(1), 
(2007), pp. 145-179; Mark L. Haas, op. cit., Ref. 36, Ch. 5. 
39  Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (London: Cornell University Press, 1987). 
40  Jarrod Hayes & Patrick James, ‘Theory as Thought: Britain and German Unification’, 
Security Studies, 23(2), (2014), pp. 399-429, at p. 427. 
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A.J.P. Taylor 41  and more Marxist-oriented historians of the Annales 
School and the ‘new economic history’ 42 – international historians have 
afforded ideas and ideologies a prominent place in their analyses. 
 
Historical scholarship on international ideologies may be differentiated 
from the other research programmes under discussion by the 
epistemological and ontological assumptions underlying the historical 
method. First, historical works are generally inductive rather than 
deductive; they seek to infer more generalizable claims from their 
narratives rather than create (or interpret) the empirical record through a 
deductively established theoretical lens. 43  As a result, the arguments 
proffered by historians regarding ideology are generally more specific than 
their alternatives, having been ‘fitted’ to the case under study.44 Second, 
historical works regard ideology as only one factor among many relevant 
to a full explanation of foreign policy and international relations. In this 
regard, they are generally proponents of multi-causal, non-reductionist 
explanations. In contrast to other research programmes, alternative 
explanations are regarded as complementary rather than as confounding 
or competing factors. Third, historians have been sceptical about treating 
their empirical discussions as distinct cases to which the assumptions of 
                                                        
41  A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe: 1848-1918 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1954). 
42  See Jack S. Levy, ‘Too Important to Leave to the Other: History and Political Science 
in the Study of International Relations’, International Security, 22(1), (1997), pp. 22-
33, at p. 28, for a discussion. 
43  John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002). 
44  Positivist scholars, in contrast, strive hard to avoid ‘over-fitting’ models, lest this 
reduce their general applicability. 
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comparative analysis can be applied. They also utilise a greater number of 
primary sources than alternative case-based researchers. 
 
Some historical works examine narrow time-periods, tracing the role of 
distinct ideologies at pivotal times and emphasising the specificities of the 
case under study. Pugh’s examination of liberal internationalism in the 
interwar peace movement in Britain45 and Ceadel’s conceptual study of 
the international ideologies associated with the peace movement during 
the Cold War both offer examples of specific and tightly delineated 
histories of ideology. 46  So, too, do Gat’s study of liberal and fascist 
conceptions of war in the early twentieth century,47 Steffek’s account of 
‘fascist internationalism’ in the interwar period,48 and Chapnick’s study of 
conservative thought and its effect on Canadian foreign policy in the post-
war period.49 
 
Other works are broader in scope, seeking to examine the role played by 
ideology in foreign policy decisions of international politics over a broad 
period of time and often drawing insights from more specific historical 
works as they go. Gaddis’ history of Cold War containment strategy, with 
its emphasis on domestic political changes and the socio-economic 
                                                        
45  Michael Pugh, Liberal Internationalism: The Interwar Movement for Peace in Britain 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 2-4. 
46  Martin Ceadel, op. cit., Ref. 1. 
47  Azar Gat, Fascist and Liberal Visions of War: Fuller, Liddell Hart, Douhet, and Other 
Modernists (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). 
48  Jens Steffek, ‘Fascist internationalism’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 
44(1), (2015), pp. 3-22, p. 9. 
49  Adam Chapnick, ‘Peace, order, and good government: The “conservative” tradition in 
Canadian foreign policy’, International Journal, 60, (2004), pp. 635-650. 
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philosophies of the Democrat and Republican parties is an early 
example,50 as is Hunt’s survey of ideology and American history in which 
he establishes the dominance of ideas concerning individualism and racial 
hierarchy in the conduct of American foreign policy.51 Other works in this 
vein include Casells’ study of ideology and international relations from the 
enlightenment to the post-Cold War world,52 Thérien and Noël’s history of 
the politics of globalisation from 1945 to the present day53 and Ikenberry’s 
study of liberalism and post-war American foreign relations.54 
 
 
Philosophical 
 
The philosophical tradition associated with ideological analysis and world 
politics has largely emerged within the sub-field of normative 
international theory (or, as it is sometimes named, ‘international political 
theory’). Philosophical works have emphasised the contingency of 
international theory/thought and the need to situate the roots of analytical 
theories within broader debates in the history of political philosophy. Such 
theories as realism and liberalism, from the perspective of the 
                                                        
50  John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar 
American National Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). 
51  Michael Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1987). 
52  Alan Cassels, Ideology and International Relations in the Modern World (London: 
Routledge, 1996). 
53  Jean-Philippe Thérien & Alain Noël, Left and Right in Global Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
54  G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the 
American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). Although 
Ikenberry is regarded as a liberal theorist within the discipline of International 
Relations, much of his work is historical in its assumptions and presentation. 
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philosophical tradition, are understood rather as distinct constellations of 
political assumptions. By outlining the key traditions of international 
thought, these works have helped draw attention to the existence of 
diverse constituencies of thought interpreting the nature of ‘the 
international’. 
 
The philosophical literature may be distinguished, in the first place, by 
the extent to which it is embedded in the ‘Western’ philosophical tradition 
and the canon of theorists often associated with this, from the Ancient 
Greeks, through Christian philosophy, to the liberal theorists of the 
Enlightenment and post-Rawlsian debates on modern liberalism.  The 
second hallmark of the philosophical approach is its commitment to the 
analytical tradition and to the notion of an underlying, and discernible, 
social and political ‘reality’, and to the rejection of relativism, anti-
foundationalism and philosophical pragmatism. Third, and related, 
philosophical works embrace the distinction between positive and 
normative theory – that is, between social science and moral theory, and 
between the categories of ‘is’ and ‘ought’. This separation between the 
normative and positive domains of social reality is a product of the 
analytical commitments associated with the philosophical approach and is 
not found within the critical or reflexive paradigms (discussed below). 
 
Several diverse literatures have taken seriously the relationship between 
ideology and international politics. Many of these contributions lie at the 
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nexus of political philosophy and IR, which have interrogated the 
international corollaries of traditional concepts of political authority. For 
some this has entailed study of socialism, liberalism and conservatism, 
and how each understands ‘the international’ differently.55 For others it 
has involved a more direct comparison between the distinct ‘Western’ 
traditions of Kantianism, Hobbesianism, Grotianism, and various other 
traditions. 56 Members of the English School of international relations – a 
tradition of inquiry dedicated to the study of ‘international society’ which 
draws heavily on political philosophy57 – have also sought to examine the 
effects of these traditions of international thought on state behaviour.58 
Finally, debates concerning the relative strength, and merits, of 
cosmopolitanism and communitarianism – and the extent to which norms 
of global community are supplanting individuals’ commitments to ‘their’ 
nation – have been the subject of a significant literature within global 
                                                        
55  Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1997), pp. 18-20. 
56  Kant, Hobbes, Machiavelli and Rousseau typically figure in most accounts. For a 
discussion of international theory in the ‘Western’ canon see Chris Brown, Terry 
Nardin and Nicholas Rengger, International Relations in Political Thought: Texts 
from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002); David Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations: From 
Thucydides to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Beate Jahn, 
Classical Theory in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), and Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1954). 
57  Andrew Hurrell, ‘Keeping history, law and political philosophy firmly within the 
English School’, Review of International Studies, 27(3), (2001), pp. 489-494, at p. 490. 
58  See, for example, the distinction between ‘realism, rationalism and revolutionism’ in 
Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions (London: Leicester 
University Press, 1991), and the discussion of ‘Grotianism, Kantianism and 
Hobbesianism’ and ‘internationalism, universalism and realism’ in Hedley Bull, The 
Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1977), p. 23. 
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politics, one that shares many of the assumptions of the philosophical 
approach to the study of international ideologies.59 
 
 
Critical 
 
Critical theorists have also interrogated the theory/ideology nexus. 
Critical accounts, as befits their Marxist ontology, exhibit several 
distinguishing features. First – and in common with the postmodern 
perspective – they regard ideologies as temporally contingent phenomena 
that arise out of certain (contingent) historical circumstances and events. 
Thus, Cox has argued that ideologies may be regarded as ‘practically 
useful…guides to action under specific historical conditions’.60  Second, 
critical scholars regard international ideologies as reductionist and 
inaccurate representations of an underlying reality – as a camera obscura, 
in Marxist terminology.61 The corollary of the critical scholars’ view of 
                                                        
59  For a discussion of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism see: Michael Zürn and 
Pieter de Wilde, ‘Debating globalization: cosmopolitanism and communitarianism as 
political ideologies’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 21(3), pp. 280-301, at pp. 284-287; 
Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992); Garrett Wallace Brown, ‘State Sovereignty, 
Federation and Kantian Cosmopolitanism’ European Journal of International 
Relations, 11(4), (2005), pp. 495-522; Toni Erskine, Embedded Cosmopolitanism: 
Duties to Strangers and Enemies in a World of ‘Dislocated Communities’ (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 16; Mervyn Frost, Ethics in International Relations: 
A Constitutive Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and David 
Held, ‘Restructuring Global Governance: Cosmopolitanism, Democracy and the Global 
Order’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 37(3), (2009), pp. 535-547, at p. 
537. 
60  Robert W. Cox, ‘Ideologies and the new international economic order: reflections on 
some recent literature’, International Organization, 33(2), (1979), pp. 257-302, at p. 
300. 
61  Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of 
International Relations (London: Verso, 1994), p. 30; Hartmut Behr & Amelia Heath, 
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ideology as ‘false consciousness’ is the retention by critical scholars of an 
underlying belief in a foundational ontology; that is, in the belief of an 
accessible and interpretable reality beneath these ‘false’ ideological 
structures. Third, critical scholars posit that these ‘distortions’ of reality 
emerge because they serve discernible interests. In his early work Cox was 
explicit about this link, stating: ‘Ideological analysis is… a critic's weapon 
and one most effectively used against the prevailing orthodoxies which, 
when stripped of their putative universality, become seen as special 
pleading for historically transient but presently entrenched interests’. 62 
 
The most famous example of this form of theorising is to be found in Cox’s 
path-breaking Millennium article in which he argued ‘all theory is for 
some one and some purpose’.63 This more general claim builds on his 
earlier work on the new economic ideology (neo-liberalism).64 Since Cox’s 
intervention, critical scholars have achieved significant analytical leverage 
examining IR theories as ideologies. Rosenberg, for example, has 
examined the role of realist ideology in legitimating nineteenth-century 
European foreign policy, arguing that commercial interests ultimately lay 
beneath the imperialist practices of the period.65 His critique of realism 
regards the theory as ‘the conservative ideology of the exercise of modern 
                                                                                                                                                              
‘Misreading in IR theory and ideology critique: Morgenthau, Waltz and neo-realism’, 
Review of International Studies, 35, (2009), pp. 327-349, at p. 330. 
62  Robert W. Cox, op. cit., Ref. 59, p. 257. 
63  Robert W. Cox, ‘Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relations Theory’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10(2), (1981), pp. 
126-155. 
64  Robert W. Cox, op. cit., Ref. 59. 
65  Justin Rosenberg, op. cit., Ref. 60; Justin Rosenberg, ‘What’s the Matter with 
Realism?’, Review of International Studies, 16(4), (1990), pp. 291-292 
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state power’, a ruling ideology that serves the interests of state-based 
elites.66 Behr and Heath’s analysis of neo-realism – and their depiction of 
the tradition as an ideology which serves elite interests – also has its roots 
in the critical tradition.67 Behr and Heath regard the development of IR as 
a discipline, an ideological act which, they argue, acted to legitimate state 
power and imperialism in the 19th century.68 
 
There is also a significant critical literature influenced by the writings of 
Antonio Gramsci which has focused much of its attention on the efficacy of 
the global, elite-driven nature of neoliberal ideology and its implications 
for international relations.69Gill, for example, has examined the power-
structures, in the form of domestic and transnational ‘complexes’, 
underpinning the globalisation of free-market liberalism since the 1980s,70 
while Birchfield has similarly utilised Gramsci’s thought to expose the 
agency required to maintain the ideological hegemony of globalization as 
‘common sense’.71 These works place significant emphasis on the efficacy 
of ideology as an independent driving force in world politics and its role in 
constituting ‘subjectivity’, in contrast to more traditional 
                                                        
66  Justin Rosenberg, op. cit., Ref. 60, p. 30. 
67  Hartmut Behr & Amelia Heath, op. cit., Ref. 60. 
68  Hartmut Behr & Amelia Heath, op. cit., Ref. 60, p. 349. 
69  See, for example, R.D. Germain & M. Kenny, ‘Engaging Gramsci: international 
relations theory and the new Gramscians’, Review of International Studies, 24(1), 
(1998), pp. 3-21 and S. Gill & D. Law, ‘Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of 
Capital’, in S. Gill (Ed.), Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Stephen Gill, ‘Globalization, Market 
Civilization and Disciplinary Neoliberalism’, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies, 24(3), (1995), pp. 399-423; Vicki Birchfield, ‘Contesting the hegemony of 
market ideology: Gramsci’s ‘good sense’ and Polanyi’s ‘double movement’’, Review of 
International Political Economy, 6(1), (1999), pp. 27-54. 
70   Stephen Gill, op. cit., Ref 68, p. 400. 
71   Vicki Birchfield, op. cit., Ref. 68, pp. 44-45. 
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(‘unreconstructed’) Marxist accounts which regard international ideologies 
as the product of economic and historical conditions. 
 
 
Reflexive 
 
A further source of research on IR theory as ideology has emerged within 
reflexive scholarship on international politics that has grown out of the 
‘interpretivist turn’ in the discipline. Reflexivist works have three 
distinguishing features that set them apart from other works on ideology 
and world politics. The first is their subscription to an antifoundational 
ontology which eschews the notion of an independent perspective – an 
Archimedian standpoint – from which knowledge of the social world can 
be accumulated. This entails a rejection of certainty in both positive and 
normative theorising; since there exists no neutral means of social and 
political analysis. Second, and in consequence of their antifoundational 
ontology, reflexivist scholars eschew the positivist endeavour of ‘theory 
building’, opting rather to deconstruct and destabilise pre-existing 
theoretical assumptions. Their intention is not to reconstruct social 
scientific analysis but to deconstruct social scientific claims and 
assumptions by highlighting their contingent, ideological nature. Third, 
reflexive scholarship employs interpretive methods to interrogate the 
relationship between ideology and world politics. The narratives offered by 
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reflexivist scholars aim at producing ‘thick description72 of a circumscribed 
period of time over thinner accounts of lengthier historical period, and 
make no claims to representativity or other criteria of ‘case selection’. 
 
The starting point for most reflexivist analysis has been to challenge the 
assumed objectivism of mainstream theory and much of positivist social 
science. These works have sought to combine insights from pragmatist 
and  postmodern philosophy with interpretive readings of empirical 
phenomena. Intellectual historians working from a critical philosophical 
perspective have demonstrated the underlying ideological basis of 
mainstream theoretical traditions in IR. Jahn’s studies of such core IR 
concepts as ‘the state of nature’, liberal internationalism and critical 
theory – and her insistence that these ‘theories’ are unable to shed their 
ideological credentials – are examples. 73  Bell’s analyses of ‘analytical’ 
theories (realism and liberalism) in the context of nineteenth-century 
British foreign policy are also representative of the reflexive tradition. He 
argues that the positivist assumption that realism is a neutral analytical 
tool is ‘untenable’ and presents an account of realist ideology in Victorian 
                                                        
72  Clifford Geertz, ‘Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture’, in 
Michael Martin & Lee C. McIntyre (Eds.) Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science 
(London: MIT Press, 1994), pp. 213-232. 
73  Beate Jahn, ‘IR and the state of nature: the cultural origins of a ruling ideology’, 
Review of International Studies, 25, (1999), pp. 411-434; Beate Jahn, ‘One stop 
forward, two steps back: critical theory as the latest edition of liberal idealism’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 27(3), (1998), pp. 613-641; Beate Jahn, 
Liberal Internationalism: Theory, History, Practice (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013). 
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Britain which emphasises the power of the discourse to legitimate 
imperialist foreign policies.74 
 
Other reflexivist scholarship is associated with, and influenced by, 
postmodern constructivism in IR.75 One of the earliest examples is to be 
found in Walker’s Inside/Outside in which he claims theories of 
international relations are best understood as ‘political theory’ in light of 
their implicit normative claims and the role these play in constructing the 
social reality of the international.76 Later works have had more of an 
empirical focus. In his study of the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization, for example, Schindler argues that political positions are 
structured by dichotomies of human vs. state rational choice vs. social 
construction, affording these commonplace theoretical categories a 
politico-ideological status.77 Ish-Shalom’s studies of the hermeneutics of 
modernization theory and the democratic peace thesis are also written in 
this vein; in both cases Ish-Shalom examines the effects of theories outside 
the ‘ivory tower’ on the foreign policies of the Kennedy and Clinton 
                                                        
74  Duncan Bell, op. cit., Ref. 2, pp. 229, 234; Duncan Bell, ‘Empire and International 
Relations in Victorian Political Thought’, The Historical Journal, 49(1), (2006), pp. 
281-298, at p. 285. 
75  On ‘postmodern’ constructivism specifically, see: Steve Smith, ‘Singing Our World into 
Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11’, International Studies 
Quarterly, 48(3), (2004), pp. 499-515; Patrick Jackson, op. cit., Ref. 17, pp. 150-151; 
Stefano Guzzini, ‘A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations’, 
European Journal of International Relations, 6(2), (2000), pp. 147-182. 
76  R.B.J. Walker, op. cit., Ref. 8. 
77  Sebastian Schindler, ‘Man versus State: Contested Agency in the United Nations’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 43(1), (2014), pp. 3-23, at pp. 9-14. 
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presidencies respectively, arguing in consequence that the act of 
theorising is always a normative endeavour.78 
 
 
Key Questions and Debates 
 
Each of the five paradigms discussed above represents a (largely) distinct 
field of study within which the examination of ideology and world politics 
is undertaken and conversations about ‘international ideologies’ are 
commonplace. Yet there is significant diversity of thought across these 
traditions as to the nature of international ideologies and their role in 
world politics. In this final section I discuss four key areas of divergence, 
both within and between these paradigms. These disagreements have 
helped to maintain the fractious nature of the field of ideological analysis 
and world politics, but in their diversity they also hint at promising lines 
of future inquiry. 
 
What is the status of these beliefs? 
 
One area of significant disagreement – indeed, one that divides the field of 
study more than anything else – is that over the ontological status of 
international ‘ideologies’. Whilst many scholars agree that beliefs about 
                                                        
78  Piki Ish-Shalom, ‘Theory as a Hermeneutical Mechanism: The Democratic-Peace 
Thesis and the Politics of Democratization’, European Journal of International 
Relations, 12(4), (2006), pp. 565-598; Piki Ish-Shalom, ‘Theory Gets Real, and the Case 
for a Normative Ethic: Rostow, Modernization Theory, and the Alliance for Progress’, 
International Studies Quarterly, 50, (2006), pp. 287-311. 
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the nature and operation of ‘the international’ are important, there is 
significant disagreement about how the content of these beliefs should be 
understood. This is reflected in the language used to describe these ideas, 
which varies from scholar to scholar. In a majority of the works considered 
the term ‘ideology’ is explicitly used. In many others, synonyms are used, 
including the terms ‘worldview’79 and ‘vision’.80 Other terms deployed are 
not necessarily synonymous, and examples of alternative phraseology 
include the following terms: ‘theories’,81 ‘paradigms’,82 ‘belief systems’,83 
‘political theories’,84 ‘partisan lenses’,85  ‘traditions of thought’86  and ‘folk 
theories’.87 
 
Analytical works often utilise a scientistic register, emphasising the 
systematic nature of the different worldviews (e.g. ‘belief system’). 
Philosophical works are least likely to utilise the term ideology, opting 
generally for ‘tradition of thought’ or ‘political theory’, perhaps an 
unsurprising observation from a discipline that is traditionally highly self-
aware of its roots, and less concerned with the conduct of social analysis 
itself. Conversely, in historical and critical scholarship the term ‘ideology’ 
has been used almost exclusively, the term being both a frequent lens of 
                                                        
79  Amitav Acharya, ‘Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of Inernational Relations 
Theories Beyond the West’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 39(3), 
(2011), pp. 619-637. 
80  Azar Gat, op. cit., Ref. 46. 
81  Robert W. Cox, op. cit., Ref. 62; Sebastian Schindler, op. cit., Ref. 76; Piki Ish-Shalom, 
op. cit., Ref. 77. 
82  Brian Rathbun, op. cit., Ref. 30. 
83  Ole R. Holsti, op. cit., Ref. 20, p. 245. 
84  R.B.J. Walker, op. cit., Ref. 8. 
85  Brian Rathbun, op. cit., Ref. 4, pp.18-19. 
86  Michael Doyle, op. cit., Ref. 54. 
87  Joshua Kertzer & Kathleen McGraw, op. cit., Ref. 31, p. 247. 
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historical analysis and a core Marxist concept. Reflexive scholarship, 
finally, has utilised a broader register, its identifying feature being the 
frequency with which terms associated with social analysis are utilised 
synonymously with ideology (e.g. ‘theory’, ‘paradigm’, ‘folk theory’). 
 
The diversity in the language used to describe these beliefs matters for 
several reasons. Whilst the works considered here discuss the same 
phenomenon, the diversity of language hints at an underlying 
disagreement as to how it is best described. Most works discussed, for 
example, examine ‘realism’ in one way or another, but few of them agree 
on the best label for the tradition/ideology/theory/paradigm. At a deeper 
level, this linguistic diversity is indicative of a deeper ontological 
disagreement about what the concept itself consists of, rather than which 
term best describes the same underlying phenomenon. The choice of 
language also has implications for a host of related debates about the 
nature and sources of international ideologies. Which traditions we 
identify as most important, for example, depends on the label we apply to 
the concept: the use of ‘theory’ points to realism and liberalism, ‘tradition’ 
to Hobbesianism and Kantianism, and ‘ideology’ to socialism, liberalism 
and conservatism. 
 
The diversity of language has contributed to the separateness of 
conversations about ideology and world politics. In many cases research on 
understudied ideologies has already taken place using different 
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terminology, but with the same basic assumptions. But, although 
terminological debates matter, there are limits to the importance that 
deserves to be ascribed to linguistic differences. To begin with, in the 
manner they are actually utilised, most of these terms may be treated as 
synonymous with ideology, since they analyse collective beliefs consisting 
of inter-linked propositions concerning the international realm. Hence, 
although the diversity of language usage speaks to the existence of 
disagreement over the ontological status of ideology, there is a strong case 
to be made that the scholars discussed above are investigating essentially 
the same phenomenon. Where deeper questions about the nature of 
ideology are at stake, it must be remembered that few scholars of ideology 
agree on the ontological status of what is, by its very nature, an 
essentially contested concept. 88  Rather than allowing terminological 
differences to stymie discussion of ideology, we should consider these 
debates a core part of ideological analysis in world politics, debating the 
differences implied by the various labels and how substituting terms 
changes our understanding of the concept.  
 
 
How should these beliefs be studied? 
 
A second area of disagreement is methodological. To gain leverage over 
the nature and role of international ideology, a wide array of diverse 
                                                        
88  William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993). 
 29 
methodological tools has been deployed. Some have utilised single-n case 
studies.89 These seek to examine in detail the effects of ideology on the 
policy process at specific periods of theoretical or empirical interest. 
Alternatively, some works have utilised the comparative method, selecting 
multiple cases based on various configurations of key ‘variables’ and apply 
to these deductive logics of inference. 90  Other works have utilised the 
historical method, distinguishable from case studies by the absence of an 
explicit methodological vocabulary and the increased emphasis on primary 
source material.91 Finally, some works have utilised statistical methods to 
analyse ideology across a large number of cases. Various techniques have 
been used to process time-series and interview data.92 
 
The relationship between these different methods and the paradigms 
discussed above is not a simple one, although some broad generalisations 
can be made. Statistical analysis is, for example, conducted only within 
the analytical traditions – specifically, by liberal IR and FPA scholars – 
and has (unsurprisingly) not been utilised by historical, analytical, critical 
or philosophical scholars. The use of case studies, whilst seemingly 
ubiquitous across all five paradigms, should be differentiated by the 
emphasis placed on the criteria of representativity and boundedness. 
Whilst analytical scholars have regarded their cases as discrete examples 
                                                        
89  Ole R. Holsti, op. cit., Ref. 29; Jens Steffek, op. cit., Ref. 47. 
90  Brian Rathbun, op. cit., Ref. 4, p. 38; Mark Haas, op. cit., Ref. 36, pp. 31-35; Nicholas 
F. Martini, op. cit., Ref. 18, p. 424. 
91  Pugh, op. cit., Ref. 47. 
92  Peter H. Gries, op. cit., Ref. 23, p. 21; Joshua Kertzer & Kathleen McGraw, op. cit., 
Ref. 31, p. 248; Eugene Wittkopf, op. cit., Ref. 24, p. 427; Helen V. Milner & Benjamin 
Judkins, op. cit., Ref. 22. 
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of distinct, and generalizable, phenomena, historical, critical and reflexive 
scholarship has rather emphasised the importance of holistic and 
contextualised analysis, and down-played the value of utilising historical 
snap-shots to ‘measure’ variables. Put simply, paradigms associated with 
a more idiographic ontology have been more sceptical of the extent to 
which generalisations can be inferred from individual ‘cases’.93 
 
What’s at stake in the methodological debate is the most appropriate 
means of understanding the complex relationship between ideology and 
world politics. Each method has advantages and disadvantages in this 
respect. Single case studies highlight in the clearest detail the 
mechanisms linking ideology to outcomes in world politics, illustrating the 
complexities of individual and collective worldviews and their impact on 
the policy process at key moments. But this detail comes at a price, since 
the generalizability of these cases may be legitimately called into question. 
Comparative studies offer greater leverage over the general effects of 
ideology, since they show the effects of varying levels (or kinds) of 
ideology, although in doing so they rely overly on a deterministic model of 
causation less amenable to nuance than narrative or single-case 
methods.94 Historical analysis offers the promise of accurate and valid 
‘evidence’, contextualisation of important concepts, and understanding of 
                                                        
93  John Gerring, ‘What is a Case Study and What is It Good For?’, American Political 
Science Review, 98(2), (2004), pp. 341-354, at p. 351. 
94  James Mahoney & Gary Goertz, ‘A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative 
and Qualitative Research’, Political Analysis, 14(3), (2006), pp. 227-249, at p. 232 
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continuities and discontinuities across time,95  at the expense of either 
abandoning the pretence at causal inference or accepting a lower level of 
generalizability from one’s findings. Whilst statistical techniques run the 
risk of concept stretching, and struggle to identity causal mechanisms,96 
they are better able to establish the external validity – and magnitude – of 
ideology’s causal effect, and to control for alternative explanations.97 
 
Insofar as competing methodological traditions represent distinct ‘cultures 
of research’, they also contribute to the fragmentation of research on 
ideology and world politics. Historians and philosophers, for example, 
seldom cite quantitative work on international ideologies, and vice versa. 
Whilst there are important issues at stake in the debate over 
methodology, there are also many reasons to downplay these differences 
and to embrace a methodological pluralism. To begin with, it is 
acknowledged with increasing frequency that causation can be established 
only through a combination of insights, each of which is best achieved by 
means of different research methods.98 Demonstrating the causal efficacy 
of ideology therefore requires not only attention to the mechanisms 
linking ideology with action but also the generalizability of these 
mechanisms and their causal weight relative to other explanatory factors. 
                                                        
95  Marcus Kreuzer, ‘Historical Knowledge and Quantitative Analysis: The Case of the 
Origins of Proportional Representation’, American Political Science Review, 104(2), 
(2010), pp. 369-392, at p. 370. 
96  Sidney Tarrow, ‘Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science’, 
American Political Science Review, 89(2), (1995), pp. 471-474. 
97  Gary King, Robert Keohane, & Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
98  James Mahoney, ‘Toward a Unified Theory of Causality’, Comparative Political 
Studies, 41(4), (2008), pp. 412-436; John Gerring, ‘Causation: A Unified Framework 
for the Social Sciences’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 17(2), (2005), pp. 163-198. 
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Moreover, reaching the standard of the ‘unified’ concept of causality is a 
shared endeavour best achieved through a division of scholarly labour, 
and the findings from diverse methods should all contribute to a shared 
conversation on the effects of international ideologies. 
 
 
Which ideological traditions are most relevant? 
 
Following on from the language used to describe the concept of ideology, 
stark differences can also be observed in the ideologies under study 
themselves. A majority of works considered analyse realism in one form or 
another, though what is meant by realism differs significantly (Behr and 
Heath, for example, examine ‘neo-realist ideology’ specifically, 99  whilst 
Rosenberg equates realism with nationalism. 100  The greatest 
disagreements occur over realism’s alternate. For some scholars this is 
‘idealism’,101 for others ‘liberalism’ or ‘socialism’,102 ‘neo-liberalism’,103 and 
‘liberal internationalism’. 104  For Wight realism is contrasted with 
‘rationalism’ and ‘revolutionism’105 whilst for Hayes and James it is to be 
distinguished from ‘neoliberal institutionalism’ and ‘constructivism’. 106 
Boucher distinguished ‘empirical realism’ from ‘universal moral order’ and 
                                                        
99  Hartmut Behr & Amelia Heath, op. cit., Ref. 60. 
100  Justin Rosenberg, op. cit., Ref. 60. 
101  Joshua Kertzer & Kathleen McGraw, op. cit., Ref. 31, p. 248. 
102  Michael Doyle, op. cit., Ref. 54. 
103  Robert W. Cox, op. cit., Ref. 59. 
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‘historical reason’,107 whilst Bull uses realism only indirectly through the 
Hobbesian label, which he distinguishes from Kantianism (read: 
liberalism) and Grotianism.108  A similar indirectness may be found in 
those works drawing on a register linked to militarism, including 
Wittkopf’s distinction between ‘militant’ and ‘cooperative’ 
internationalism, 109  Ceadel’s categories of ‘militarism’, ‘crusading’, 
defencism’, ‘pacifism’ and ‘pacific-ism’,110 and Martini’s two-dimensional 
schema based on ‘militarism’ and ‘cooperation’.111 Finally, a significant 
minority of works analyse distinct traditions notionally distinct from the 
realist-‘other’ divide, including ‘left and right’,112 ‘communitarianism and 
cosmopolitanism’, 113  and even such bespoke ideologies as ‘democracy 
promotion’,114 the ‘United Nations ideology’,115 and the ‘new international 
economic order ideology’.116 
 
The greatest diversity in ideologies identified and studied is to be found in 
the analytical paradigm. This is partly because the link between 
mainstream IR/FPA and Comparative Politics has engendered an interest 
in domestic political categories (for example, ‘left’ and ‘right’) among 
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analytical scholars, but it is also a consequence of the vocabulary of ‘belief 
systems’, which lends itself to a broader range of phenomena than does 
the term ‘ideologies’. The historical and philosophical paradigms also 
feature significant diversity, though the former tend to focus on 
traditional constructs of realism/liberalism and socialism/conservatism, 
whilst the latter adds an array of paradigm-specific ideologies to this list 
(e.g. cosmopolitanism, communitarianism).  Reflexive scholarship has 
identified relevant ideologies by examining traditional categories of IR 
theory, leading to a shared focus on realism, liberalism, and critical 
theories, with an emphasis on the disciplinary, rather than societal, 
terminology (e.g. ‘neo-realism’). Critical scholarship has perhaps been the 
most unified paradigm, since the majority of works have identified 
variants of liberal ideology (incorporating neo-liberalism, neo-
mercantilism, and the ‘new economic order ideology’) as the most relevant 
ideology of international relations. 
 
At stake over the choice of ideologies is the location of the principal fault-
lines of debate in international politics. Clearly policymakers, publics and 
theorists harbour beliefs about international politics that range along a 
great many different dimensions and issues. And yet each dyad – or 
typology – discussed above paints these debates in a distinct light. 
Cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, for example, get to the heart of 
the moral value of the state, but say little about purported state 
behaviour, a question for which positions are better articulated by realism 
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and liberalism. The choice of which ideologies to study depends on 
answers to prior questions concerning the nature of these beliefs and the 
relationship between these dimensions, including: Which dimensions 
animate the most consequential disagreement? How do positions on 
different dimensions relate to one another? And to what extent to these 
disagreements vary by region, country, or level of expertise? 
 
It is evident from the discussion above that a consensus does not exist on 
the most relevant ideologies in international relations, although there is 
some area of overlap between scholars. A level of consensus has emerged 
around ‘realism’ as a dominant – or at least, most easily identifiable – 
international ideology, and though many labels exist for the ‘opposite’ to 
realism, many of these refer to similar collections of beliefs (e.g. 
liberalism, cosmopolitanism, idealism). Yet there remains disagreement 
over the principal ideologies of world politics such that an international 
equivalent of the ‘left-right’ distinction is unfeasible. This diversity, 
however, should be regarded as one of the strengths of ideological analysis 
rather than evidence of its failure. The work cited above has contributed 
to the systematic analysis of a bewildering array of different ideologies, 
each of which imagines the international in very different ways, and each 
of which aids our understanding of the primary fault-lines of disagreement 
in international affairs. As with the broadening of domestic ideological 
debate from the 1960s and 1970s onwards – a period associated with the 
rise of ecologism, feminism, and neo-liberalism – the increasing 
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heterogeneity of international ideologies opens up new avenues of 
research without undermining the core claim that world politics is 
structured by competing ideological traditions. 
 
 
 
 
Who are their holders? 
 
A final area of significant disagreement within existing scholarship 
concerns the question of who – or what – is to be considered the ‘holders’ of 
ideologies. That is, at which ‘level’ of politics should ideological analysis 
proceed. The works considered above have each emphasised the role of 
different actors, from the sub-national level – including individuals,117 
political parties, 118  scholars, 119  classes 120  and social movements, 121  to 
broader collectivities of states, 122  publics, 123  and international 
organizations. 124  Some works have also adopted a broader frame of 
reference by analysing ideologies from a global perspective, 125  a move 
which brings them close to the Foucaultian concept of ‘governmentality’ 
                                                        
117  Ole R. Holsti, op. cit., Ref. 20, p. 246. 
118  Brian Rathbun, op. cit., Ref. 4, p. 7. 
119  Brian Rathbun, op. cit., Ref. 30. 
120  Robert W. Cox, op. cit., Ref. 65. 
121  Martin Ceadel, op. cit., Ref. 1. 
122  Mark Haas, op. cit., Ref. 36. 
123  Ole R. Holsti, op. cit., Ref. 29. 
124  Jean-Philippe Thérien, op. cit., Ref. 6. 
125  R.B.J. Walker, op. cit., Ref. 8; David Chandler, ‘The Global Ideology: Rethinking the 
Politics of the ‘Global Turn’ in IR’, International Relations, 23(4), (2009), pp. 530-547. 
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(or, governing ideology). 126  There are some discernible relationships 
between the theoretical paradigm and the actors and level of analysis 
utilised. Reflexive works, for example, are more likely to emphasise global 
ideologies, whilst mainstream IR (within the analytical paradigm) most 
often embraces the state-as-actor assumption, although these are only 
broad generalisations. 
 
The decision to focus on particular actors throws up fundamental 
theoretical questions for scholars of ideology. The first concerns the level 
at which ideologies may be most coherently bounded; it is generally 
acknowledged that there exists a trade-off between individual and small-
group ideological coherence on the one hand and the ability to pursue 
large-scale collective action on the other. The second issue concerns the 
extent of access to the policymaking process; whilst the public, social 
movements, academics and opposition parties may have very little access, 
policymakers and, more broadly, governments are able to effect 
meaningful action in foreign policy. A third issue concerns the ideologies 
under study and the outcome to be explained; since some ideologies are 
located only at certain levels (neoliberal institutionalism, for example, is 
seldom evident in the public discourse), and since some topics are suited to 
specific levels of analysis more than others (studies of alliance politics, for 
instance, tend to rely on state-centric explanations), the choice of actors is 
                                                        
126  For a review of the concept of ‘global governmentality’ in International Relations see: 
Scott Hamilton, ‘Add Foucault and Stir: The Perils and Promise of Governmentality 
and the Global’, European Review of International Studies, 1(2), (2014), pp. 129-141, 
at p. 139. 
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intimately connected to the particular research question or puzzle under 
investigation. 
 
Since ideology operates on multiple levels simultaneously, there is little in 
the way of ontological disagreement between the different actor focus of 
these works. It rather depends on which ideologies are under study, what 
research question is being asked, and where the relevant variation is most 
significant. But the variation is helpful in moving the discipline forwards 
by opening up new lines of inquiry. Novel research questions that emerge 
from debates over which actors should form the basis of study include the 
following: How do the ideologies encountered differ between the various 
types – and levels – of actors involved? Do scholars, practitioners and 
publics view the international through different lenses? Are their 
respective ideologies more or less fixed, complex or robust? Which 
methodologies are best suited to the study of each actor or each level of 
analysis? And how do the kinds of questions we can answer about world 
politics change when we study different actors? 
 
 
Conclusion: The State of the Discipline 
 
The preceding discussion has attempted to illustrate both the scale and 
diversity of scholarship engaged in ideological analysis of traditions of 
international thought. Perhaps the most important finding is that 
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ideological analysis is alive and well in world politics and has been for 
many years, despite frequent protestations to the contrary from scholars 
of ideology. The real issue, I have argued, is that such analyses are 
conducted within a fractious and disaggregated field of study that serves 
to divide scholars with similar research interests in a rather arbitrary 
manner. This both confirms and disproves several long-held notions about 
the state of ideological analysis in IR; it confirms the scepticism of many 
working in the field that this body of scholarship has failed to ‘take root’. 
Yet the diversity of pre-existing works in this vein suggests the problem is 
less with the theoretical dominance of realism, or positivism, and more to 
do with internal barriers in the study of international politics. 
 
Several important debates – and key questions – emerge from the diverse 
scholarship discussed above. First, how should we understand complexes 
of beliefs in world politics? Do they deserve the term ‘ideology’, or are they 
better understood as a related – yet fundamentally distinct – 
phenomenon? Should we rather analyse them as ‘belief systems’, ‘folk 
theories’, or ‘worldviews’? Second, what is the most appropriate means of 
conducting ideological analysis in world politics? Is understanding best 
achieved through conceptual analysis and specification, by means of 
historical inquiry, through comparative case studies, or by using 
statistical analysis? Third, which traditions of international thought are 
most worthy of scholarly attention, and how should their relation to one 
another be understood? Are the domestic traditions of socialism, 
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liberalism and conservatism – and their internationalist variants – 
sufficient, or do we require bespoke labels based on the realism/idealism 
debate or pre-existing IR theories? Fourth, and finally, which individuals 
or actors should form the locus of our analyses? Is the greatest leverage 
obtained through examining the beliefs of publics, governments, policy-
makers, academics, or a combination of the above? 
 
These are important questions for scholars working at the nexus of 
ideological analysis and international politics, although easy answers will 
likely prove elusive (and potentially divisive). The diversity of ideological 
analysis in world politics, however, whilst nominally undermining the 
development of a coherent and self-reflexive research programme, should 
be seen as a blessing rather than a curse. This is for three reasons. First, 
the diversity of scholarship demonstrates the utility of ideological analysis 
for a broad array of distinct methodologies and sub-fields, and thus the 
potential for its application from varying perspectives in a diverse range of 
settings. Second, this diversity opens up a host of new debates and new 
issues, arising both from the observed disagreements between each 
paradigm’s understanding of ideology (many of which are highlighted 
above) and from evidence of gaps in the literature where different 
combinations of theories, issues, actors, or subjects may be productively 
combined. Third, diversity can be appreciated from a philosophy of science 
perspective, with the expanding remit of ideological analysis bolstering 
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the progressive credentials of the ideological analysis research 
programme.127 
 
Ideological analysis in world politics has now moved beyond the pre-
ontological stage during which its validity and theoretical relevance was 
directly challenged, thanks to ground-breaking analysis by those authors 
cited above. Yet ideological analysis as a field of study has remained 
surprisingly marginal and self-unaware over the years, largely due to the 
persistence of intra-paradigmatic thinking within the broader discipline of 
international politics. Almost without exception, historians have 
exclusively cited historians, theorists have cited theorists, and 
philosophers have cited philosophers. It has been the aim of this article to 
provoke engagement between scholars from varying theoretical and 
methodological perspectives working on international ideologies. Only by 
encouraging debate between these various factions can we fully 
understand the myriad, complex ways in which different ideological 
traditions influence world politics. By opening up new avenues of debate 
and inquiry over the nature of these traditions, the best means to study 
them, the most relevant ideologies, and the actors they are best associated 
                                                        
127  On Lakatosian criteria, progressive research programmes can be distinguished from 
their degenerative counterparts through their ability to generate additional questions 
and insights without undermining the programme’s theoretical ‘hard core’. See Imre 
Lakatos, ‘The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes’, in Imre Lakatos & 
Alan Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978), and John Vasquez, ‘The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative 
versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on 
Waltz’s Balancing Proposition’, American Political Science Review, 91(4), (1997), pp. 
899-912. 
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with, ideological analysis represents an exciting research programme in 
world politics, the full potential of which has yet to be exploited. 
 
 
